Ideas of a Nation Read online

  Constituent assembly

  The second question that I wish to raise is: Should there be a constituent assembly, charged with the function of making a constitution? Constituent assembly is on the lips of everybody. The Congress parties in their resolutions passed before the Congress ministries demanded that the constitution for India should be made by a constituent assembly composed of Indians. A constituent assembly was included in the Cripps proposals. The Sapru Committee has followed suit.

  I must state that I am wholly opposed to the proposals of a constituent assembly. It is absolutely superfluous. I regard it as a most dangerous project, which may involve this country in a civil war. In the first place, I do not see why a constituent assembly is at all necessary. Indians are not in the same position as the Fathers of the American Constitution were, when they framed the Constitution of the United States. They had to evolve ideas, suitable for the constitution for a free people. They had no constitutional patterns before them to draw upon. This cannot however be the case for Indians. Constitutional ideas and constitutional forms are ready at hand. Again, room for variety is very small. There are not more than two or three constitutional patterns to choose from. Thirdly, there are hardly any big and purely constitutional questions about which there can be said to be much dispute among Indians. It is agreed that the future Indian constitution should be federal. It is also more or less settled what subjects should go to the centre and what to the provinces. There is no quarrel over the division of revenues between the centre and the provinces, none on franchise and none on the relation of the judiciary to the legislature and the executive. The only point of dispute, which is outstanding, centres round the question of the residuary powers—whether they should be with the centre or with the provinces. But that is hardly a matter worth bothering about. Indeed, the provision contained in the present Government of India Act could be adopted as the best compromise.

  Having regard to this I cannot see why a constituent assembly is necessary to incubate a constitution. So much of the constitution of India has already been written out in the Government of India Act, 1935, that it seems to be an act of supererogation to appoint a constituent assembly to do the thing over again. All that is necessary is to delete those sections of the Government of India Act, 1935, which are inconsistent with Dominion Status.

  The only function which could be left to a constituent assembly is to find a solution of the communal problem. I am quite positive that whatever be the terms of reference of the constituent assembly, the communal question should not form a part of them. Consider the composition of the constituent assembly as suggested by the Sapru Committee. The total membership is fixed at 160. The election is by joint electorates by members of the provincial legislative assemblies under a system of proportional representation and the decision is to be by three-fourths of the members present and voting. Can a minority accept this constituent assembly as a safe body, in the impartiality of which it can place implicit confidence? The answer to this question must depend upon what answers one can give to two other questions: Does it guarantee that the representatives of a minority elected to the assembly will be its true representatives? Secondly, does it guarantee that the decision of the assembly with regard to the claims of any particular minority will not in fact be an imposition on the minority? On neither of these two questions can I confidently say that a minority need have no cause for fear.

  There are many other arguments against the plan of a Constituent Assembly. I may mention one, which I confess has influenced me greatly. When I read the history of the Union between Scotland and England, I was shocked at the corruption and bribery that was practised to win the consent of the Scottish Parliament. The whole of the Scottish Parliament was bought. The chances of corruption and bribery being used in the Indian constituent assembly to buy over members to support decisions desired by interested groups are very real. Their effects, I am sure, cannot be overlooked. If this happens, it will not only make mockery of the constituent assembly but I feel quite certain that any attempt made to enforce its decisions will result in a civil war. It is my considered opinion that the proposal of constituent assembly is more dangerous than profitable and should not be entertained.

  A new approach

  I shall be asked that if the constituent assembly is not the correct approach, what is the alternative? But I am confident in my view that if the communal question has become difficult of solution it is not because it is insoluble, nor because we had not yet employed the machinery of constituent assembly. It has become insoluble because the approach to it is fundamentally wrong. The defect in the present approach is that it proceeds by methods instead of by principles.

  The attempts at the solution of the communal problem are either in the nature of a coward’s plan to kowtow to the bully or of bully’s plan to dictate to the weak. Whenever a community grows powerful and demands certain political advantages, concessions are made to it to win its goodwill. There is no judicial examination of its claim; no judgement on merits. The result is that there are no limits to demands and there are no limits to concessions. A start is made with a demand for separate electorate for a minority. It is granted. It is followed by a demand for a separate electorate for a community irrespective of the fact whether it is a minority or majority. That is granted. A demand is made for separate representation on a population basis. That is conceded. Next, a claim is made for weightage in representation. That is granted. It is followed by a demand for statutory majority over other minorities with the right for the majority to retain separate electorates. This is granted. This is followed by a demand that the majority rule of another community is intolerable, and therefore without prejudice to its rights to maintain majority rule over other minorities, the majority of the offending community should be reduced to equality. Nothing can be more absurd than this policy of eternal appeasement. It is a policy of limitless demand followed by endless appeasement.

  Frankly, I don’t blame the community that indulges in this strategy. It indulges in it because it has found that it pays, it pursues it because there are no principles to fix the limits and it believes that more could be legitimately asked and would be easily given. On the other hand, there is a community economically poor, socially degraded, educationally backward and which is exploited, oppressed and tyrannized without shame and without remorse, disowned by society, unowned by government and which has no security for protection and no guarantee for justice, fair play and equal opportunity. Such a community is told that it can have no safeguards, not because it has no case for safeguards but only because the bully on whom the bill of rights is presented thinks that because the community is not politically organized to have sanctions behind its demand he can successfully bluff.

  All this differential treatment is due to the fact that there are no principles, which are accepted as authoritative and binding on those who are parties to the communal question. The absence of principles has another deleterious effect. It has made impossible for public opinion to play its part. The public only knows methods and notes that one method has failed and another is being suggested. It does not know why one method has failed and why another is said to be likely to succeed. The result is that the public, instead of being mobilized to force obstinate and recalcitrant parties to see sense and reason, are only witnessing the discussions of communal questions whenever they take place as mere shows.

  The approach I am making for the solution of the communal problem is therefore based upon two considerations:

  (1) That in proceeding to solve the communal problem it is essential to define the governing principles which should be invoked for determining the final solution, and

  (2) That whatever the governing principles they must be applied to all parties equally without fear or favour.

  Underlying principles

  I now proceed to state the principles on which distribution [should be] made. They are:

  (1) Majority rule is untenable in theory and unjustifiable in pra
ctice. A majority community may be conceded a relative majority of representation but it can never claim an absolute majority

  (2) The relative majority of representation given to a majority community in the legislature should not be so large as to enable the majority to establish its rule with the help of the smallest minorities.

  (3) The distribution of seats should be so made that a combination of the majority and one of the major minorities should not give the combine such a majority as to make them impervious to the interest of the minorities.

  (4) The distribution should be so made that if all the minorities combine they could, without depending on the majority, form a government of their own.

  (5) The weightage taken from the majority should be distributed among the minorities in inverse proportion to their social standing, economic position and educational condition so that a minority which is large and which has a better social, educational and economic standing gets a lesser amount of weightage than a minority whose numbers are less and whose educational, economic and social position is inferior to that of the others.

  Nature of the electorate

  With regard to the question of electorates the following propositions should be accepted:

  (1) Joint electorate or separate electorate is a matter of machinery for achieving a given purpose. It is not a matter of principle.

  (2) The purpose is to enable a minority to select candidates to the Legislature who will be real and not nominal representatives of the minority.

  (3) While separate electorate gives an absolute guarantee to the minority, that its representatives will be no others except those who enjoy its confidence, a system of joint electorates which will give equal protection to the minorities should not be overlooked.

  (4) A four-member constituency, with a right to the minorities to have a double vote and requiring a minimum percentage of minority votes, may be considered as a possible substitute.

  Matters not covered

  (i) QUESTION OF SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS

  There are other demands made on behalf of particular minorities such as:

  (1) Provision of a statutory officer to report on the condition of minorities.

  (2) Statutory provision of state aid for education, and

  (3) Statutory provision for land settlement. But they are not of a communal character, I do not therefore wish to enlarge upon them here.

  (ii) ABORIGINAL TRIBES

  It will be obvious that my proposals do not cover the aboriginal tribes although they are larger in number than the Sikhs, Anglo Indians, Indian Christians and Parsees. I may state the reasons why I have omitted them from my scheme. The Aboriginal Tribes have not as yet developed any political sense to make the best use of their political opportunities and they may easily become mere instruments in the hands either of a majority or a minority and thereby disturb the balance without doing any good to themselves. In the present stage of their development it seems to me that the proper thing to do for these backward communities is to establish a statutory commission to administer what are now called the ‘excluded areas’ on the same basis as was done in the case of the South African Constitution. Every province in which these excluded areas are situated should be compelled to make an annual contribution of a prescribed amount for the administration of these areas.

  (iii) INDIAN STATES

  It will also be noticed that my proposals do not include the Indian states. I am not opposed to the inclusion of the Indian states, provided the terms and conditions of inclusion are such—

  (1) that the dichotomy of divided sovereignty between British India and Indian states is completely done away with,

  (2) that the judicial and political boundaries which separate British India from Indian states will disappear, that there will be no such entities as British India or Indian states and in their place there will be only one entity namely India, and

  (3) that the terms and conditions of inclusion do not prevent India from having full and plenary powers of a Dominion. I have worked out a scheme for the fusion of the Indian states and British India, which will permit the realization of these objects. I do not wish to over burden this address with the details of the plan. For the moment, it is better if British India marches to her goal without complicating its progress by an entanglement with the Indian states.

  Pakistan in the light of proposals

  My proposals are for an United India. They are made in the hope that the Muslims will accept them in preference to Pakistan as providing better security than Pakistan does. I am not against Pakistan, I believe it is founded on principle of self-determination, which it is now too late to question. I am prepared to give them the benefit of the principle, on condition that the Muslims do not deny the benefit of the principles to the Non-Muslim residents of the area. But I believe, I am entitled to draw the attention of the Muslims to another and a better plan of security. I claim that my plan is better than the plan of Pakistan. Let me state the points which tell in favour of my plan. They are: (i) Under my proposal the danger of a communal majority, which is the basis of Pakistan, is removed. (ii) Under my proposal the weightage at present enjoyed by the Muslims is not disturbed. (iii) The position of Muslims in the Non-Pakistan Provinces is greatly strengthened by an increase in their representation, which they may not get if Pakistan comes and which will leave them in a more helpless condition than they are in at present.

  A word to Hindus

  Much of the difficulty over the communal question is due to the insistence of the Hindus that the rule of majority is sacrosanct and that it must be maintained at all costs. The Hindu does not seem to be aware of the fact that there is another rule which is also operative in fields where important disputes between individual and nations arise and that rule is a rule of unanimity. If he will take the trouble to examine the position he will realize that such a rule is not a fiction, but it does exist. Let him take the jury system. In the jury trial the principle is unanimity. The decision is binding upon the judge, only if the verdict of the jury is unanimous. Let him take another illustration that of the League of Nations. What was the rule for decisions in the League of Nations? The rule was a rule of unanimity. It is obvious that if the principle of unanimity was accepted by the Hindus as a rule of decision in the Legislature and in the Executive there would be no such thing as a communal problem in India.

  One may well ask the Hindu that if he is not prepared to concede constitutional safeguards to the minorities, is he prepared to agree to the rule of unanimity? Unfortunately he is not prepared to accept either.

  About the rule of majority the Hindu is not prepared to admit any limitations. The majority he wants is an absolute majority. He will not be satisfied with relative majority. He should consider whether his insistence on absolute majority is fair proposition, which political philosophers can accept. He is not aware that even the constitution of the United States does not lend support to the absolutistic rule of majority rule—on which the Hindu has been insisting upon.

  All these cases are of course familiar to many a Hindu. The pity of it is, he does not read from them the correct lesson. If he did, he would realize that the rule of the majority rule is not as sacrosanct a principle as he thinks it is. The majority rule is not accepted as a principle but is tolerated as a rule. I might also state why it is tolerated. It is tolerated for two reasons; (1) because the majority is always a political majority and (2) because the decision of a political majority accepts and absorbs so much of the point of view of the minority that the minority does not care to rebel against the decision.

  In India, the majority is not a political majority. In India the majority is born; it is not made. That is the difference between a communal majority and a political majority. A political majority is not a fixed or a permanent majority. It is a majority which is always made, unmade and remade. A communal majority is a permanent majority fixed in its attitude. One can destroy it, but one cannot transform it. If there is so much objection to a political m
ajority how very fatal must be the objection to a communal majority?

  It may be open to the Hindus to ask Mr Jinnah why in 1930 when he formulated his fourteen points he insisted upon the principle of majority rule to such an extent that one of the fourteen points stipulated that in granting weightage, limits should be placed whereby a majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality. It may be open to the Hindus to ask Mr Jinnah if he is in favour of a Muslim majority in Muslim provinces, why he is opposed to a Hindu majority in the centre? The Hindu must however realize that these posers may lead to the conclusion that Mr Jinnah’s position is inconsistent. They cannot lead to the affirmation of the principle of majority rule.

  The abandonment of the principle of majority rule in politics cannot affect the Hindus very much in other walks of life. As an element in social life they will remain a majority. They will have the monopoly of trade and business which they enjoy. They will have the monopoly of the property which they have. My proposals do not ask the Hindus to accept the principle of unanimity. My proposals do not ask the Hindus to abandon the principle of majority rule. All I am asking them is to be satisfied with a relative majority. Is it too much for them to concede this?

  Without marking any such sacrifice the Hindu majority is not justified in representing to the outside world that the minorities are holding up India’s freedom. This false propaganda will not pay. For the minorities are doing nothing of the kind. They are prepared to accept freedom and the dangers in which they likely to be involved provided they are granted satisfactory safeguards. This gesture of the minorities is not to be treated as a matter for which Hindus need not be grateful. It may well be contrasted with what happened in Ireland. Mr Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalists once told Carson, the leader of Ulster, ‘Consent to United Ireland, ask for any safeguard and they shall be granted to you.’ He is reported to have turned round and said: ‘Damn your safeguards; we don’t want to be ruled by you.’ The minorities in India have not said that. They are ready to be satisfied with safeguards.